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seem that the alleged contemnor could
hardly meet his burden of proof. In violation of support orders, it is generally recognized that in the proceedings instituted to coerce payment of the ordered
sums the burden is upon the alleged contemnor to prove his inability to comply
with the order. 53 A. L. R. 2d 591. Since
inability to pay is a complete defense, it is
very important for the alleged contemnor to plan his defense adequately. The
best way to plan a defense, however, is
with the able assistance of an attomey,
who would best know how to present
the case to the judge and how to arrange
an equitable solution with the State's Attomey.
If the contemnor is indigent, then it
does not seem possible for him to
employ effective counsel. And, the fact
that he may be indigent does not insure
that he can convince the judge of his inability to pay. Coercive imprisonment is
remedial, of course, only when the defendant is able to comply. Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948). And, as
the Supreme Court said, " ... to jail one
for a contempt for omitting an act he is
powerless to perform ... would ... make
the proceeding purely punitive, to describe it charitably." 333 U.S., at 72.
This is true because imprisoning a defendant incapable of performance cannot possibly cause him to take action to
benefit the complainant.

The Maryland Rules of Procedure,
Rule P4, § a, allows the institution of
constructive contempts by "the court on
its own motion, by the State's attomey
or by any person having actual knowledge of the alleged contempt." After the
proceeding is instituted, the defendant is
issued a show cause order requiring him
to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt. Md. Rule P4, § b. It is clear
that simply citing the defendant to sholN
cause why he should not be held in contempt is not the equivalent of adjudicating him in contempt. Gatuso v. Gatuso,
16 Md. App. 632,299 A. 2d 113, 115
(1973). The court may, also, appoint the
State's Attorney or any other member of
the Bar to prosecute the case. State v.
Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 878. So many
of these procedures partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding that it
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seems illusory to call the action a "civil"
contempt. Courts should be more concemed with the constitutional rights of
defendants than they are with mere
forms or labels attached to proceedings.
The Argersinger ruling should be extended to the case of a civil contemnor

since such action has many of the attributes of a criminal action, except for the
name civil. The only problem would
seem to be statutory authority for the
appointment of counsel in Maryland.
The next issue of THE FORUM will pose
such a solution.
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At common law, the parent - child relationship alone is an insufficient basis

for holding the parent liable for the torts
of his minor child. Kerrigan v. Carroll,
168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935). Under
the common law, however, there are
many examples where the parent becomes liable for the intentional torts of
his minor children. Liability is often
based on the parent's knowledge or imputed knowledge concerning the vicious
propensities of the child to do acts which
would injure persons or property. The
mere knowledge however, of this disposition is not of itself sufficient to impose
liability upon the parent. Conde! v. Savo,
350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944). The

liability results from the parent's failure
to restrain the child where he knows that
the child is likely to injure others. Ryley v.
Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Ida. 1933).
Liability is also often based on an
agency "respondeat superior" theory.
In this situation, the parent may be held
liable for his minor child's tort, where the
child was acting within the scope of his
employment and the parent is the
employer. Hawes v. Haynes, 219 N.C.
535, 14 S.E. 503 (1941). The parent
may also be held liable under this theory
where he consents to or ratifies the
child's tort. Statz v. Poke, 266 Wis. 231,
62 N.W.2d 556 (1954).
The dangerous instrumentalities doctrine is another basis for the liability of
the parent for the torts of his child. In
these cases, liability has been found
where the parent permits his child to use
a chattel which is likely to be so used that
it will cause harm to others, because of
the child's immaturity. Gerlat v. Christianson, 108 N.W.2d 194 (Wis., 1961).
Under this doctrine, the parent is not actually liable for the child's tort, but for his
own negligence in making it possible for
the child to use the dangerous instrumentality. The parent's responsibility for
the tort arises from the act of creating the
risk by placing the instrumentality in the
hands of his child whose use of the item
will cause a significant risk to third parties. Before the liability attaches, the parent's negligence in permitting the child to
have such an instrumentality must be
shown and the injury must be shown to
be reasonably forseeable. Dickens v.
Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 P. 356
(1920).
In the determination of liability under
the dangerous instrumentalities doctrine, four factors must be taken into account: (1) the nature of the instrumentality, (2) the facts constituting the child's
incompetency, (3) the parent's knowledge of those facts and (4) the parent's
failure to act in a reasonable manner so
as to prevent the minor child's tort. 19
Ala.L.Rev. 123 (1966). In applying
these factors, the parent's knowledge of
the child's incompetency is imputed
from the parent's familiarity with facts of
the child's incompetency, because of the
close relationship. Stoelting v. Hauck,
32 N.J. 87, 159 A.2d 385 (1960). The

greater the incompetency and the more
dangerous the instrumentality, the
greater the probability that knowledge of
the parent's incompetency will be found.
Johnson v. Glidden, 80 So.2d 701 (Ra.
1955).
While the common law does not provide for parental liability for the torts of
their minor children solely on the basis of
the parental relationship, statutory law in
effect in forty-six states does provide for
such liability. In Maryland, Article 26 §
71A of the Md. Annot. Code proVides
for the recovery from parents for damages "willfully or maliciously caused or
committed by the minor child of such
parent." Recovery is allowed not only
for property losses, but also for medical
expenses. There is a $1,000 limitation
on parental liability.
In most of the states which have such
parental liability statutes in effect, the
statutes were passed in the last twenty
years. Michigan was one of the first states
to enact such a statute; publication of the
favorable results of the Michigan Act in
the non-academic media, especially in
an article in the Family Circle magazine,
reprinted in 68 Reader's Digest 161:1
(1956) was influential in the passage of
similar acts in other states. This article
reported significant reductions in
juvenile crime in major Michigan cities
after its enactment. More recently however, writers have questioned the significance of these statutes in the rates of
juvenile crime. (See Freer, "Parental Libality [sic] for Torts of Children" 53
Ky.L.J. 254 at p. 265.)
The constitutionality of these statutes
has been attacked in five reported cases.
In four out of the five cases, the statutes
have been upheld as a proper exercise of
the police power of the state. Only in the
Georgia case of Corley v. Lewless, 227
Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 776 (1971) did the
court decide that the statute was unconstitutional. The reason it gave was that
liability without fault is a violation of due
process; it did not indicate why it is in fact
such a violation. It is clear that the court
does not mean this literally because
there are several important examples of
liability without fault in the law. Workman's Compensation and products liability are just two examples. (See 23
Mercer L.Rev. 681 at page 682.)

The strongest argument in favor of
constitutionality was made by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the case
of Matter of Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 180,
315 A.2d 110 (1974). In this case, a
juvenile master found the two Sorrell
children guilty of punching and injuring
another child. The parents of the Sorrell
children appealed a judgment against
them for the damages caused by their
children. The Court of Special Appeals
cited Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 99 L.Ed. 563, 75 S.Ct. 461
(1955) in finding the statute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In
that case it was held that state legislation
imposing regulations under the police
power is valid if it might have been
thought by the legislature that the particular measure was a rational way to
correct it. The court also cited Atlantic
Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548,
58 L.Ed. 721, 34 S.Ct. 364 (1914)
which stated that "the exercise of the
power is fair when the purpose is a proper public one and the means employed
bear a real and substantial relation to the
end sought and are not arbitrary or oppressive." 323 U.S. at 558. The court
also stated its agreement with an argument made by the court in Kelly v.
Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civil
Appeals 1961), another case upholding
the constitutionality of a parental liability
statute. The argument was that there is a
legislative determination that it is better
that the parents be required to pay for
the damages of their children even
though they be faultless, than to let the
damage pass on to the innocent victim.
As this determination bears a real and
substantial relation to the end sought
and is not arbitrary or oppressive, it is
therefore a proper exercise of the police
power of the state.
It does not appear likely that the present United States Supreme Court will
overrule these state statutes as an unconstitutional infringement of due process. A more liberal court, however,
could easily find that the rational basis
for this legislation is overwhelmed by the
public policy against punishing one person for the injuries of another, in the absence of the commercial relationship
found in the Workmen's Compensation
or products liability areas.

NOVEMBER, 1975

~

